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Abstract
Twenty years  ago, as the United Kingdom  was getting  region and a survey of the literature  on efficiency  gains,
ready to launch  the privatization  of its public  services,  Estache,  Guasch, and Trujillo  assess the impact of this
Professor Littlechild  developed  and operationalized  the  regulatory  regime in Latin America. They show that
concept of price  caps as a regulatory  regime  to control  while the expected  efficiency  gains were amply  achieved,
for residual monopoly conditions in those services.  Ten  these  gains were seldom  passed  on to the users.  Instead
years later,  Latin American  countries, as they embarked  they were  shared by the government and the firms.
into their own infrastructure  reforms,  also adopted the  Moreover,  the adoption of price caps implied higher
price cap regulatory  model. Relying  on a large  data base  costs of capital and hence,  tariffs, and brought down
on the factors  driving contract renegotiation  in  the  levels of investment.
This paper-a product of the Infrastructure  Vice Presidency-is part  of a larger effort in  the vice presidency  to improve
knowledge  of infrastructure  needs.  Copies  of the paper  are  available  free  from the World  Bank,  1818  H  Street NW,
Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact Antonio Estache, room Fl1K-184, telephone  202-458-1442, fax 202-676-9594,
email  address  aestache@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at
http://econ.worldbank.org.  Jose-Luis  Guasch may be contacted  at jguasch@worldbank.org.  August 2003.  (19 pages)
The Policy Researcb Working Paper Seoes disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if  the presentations  are less than  fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the autbors  and sbould be cited accordinigly. The findiitgs, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper  are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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Until the  1990s, infrastructure  services in most of Latin America were provided by state-
owned  enterprises  with  local, provincial  or national  service  monopolies. Throughout  the  1980s,
fiscal  constraints  had increasingly been inhibiting the public  sector's ability to perform some of
the basic operation  and maintenance  on infrastructure and to expand coverage of services to meet
demand.'  This slow-down led to a growing dissatisfaction  among users, generating  the necessary
political  momentum  for reforms.  Those  reforms  combined  stabilization  programs  anchored  on
public sector expenditures  with a new vision of the appropriate role of the state in the economy.
For  most  countries,  the  infrastructure  reforms  of  the  1990s  consisted  essentially  of  a
vertical  and horizontal  unbundling  of the sectors  into multiple business units-when  allowed by
country  size-- and "privatization"  of as many as possible of these business units. Competition  for
the residual  monopolies  through  auctions  was the first step towards  improvements in efficiency
levels in the sector. The reward for the winner was a long term contract with the often exclusive
right to deliver the service. The adoption  of incentive-based  regulatory regimes  and the creation
of regulatory agencies to enforce  the regulation was the second  step designed to ensure  sustained
efficiency  gains in the sectors.  UK-type price caps and the related revision processes  were part
of what increasingly looked like a "standard regulatory regime"  in the region.  Price cap  revision
timings  "a  la  UK"  had  the  advantage  of  allowing  the  governments  to  buy  time  to  get  the
regulatory  agencies in  place and to get  them going since  in most cases  the first scheduled  tariff
revisions  were 5 years  down the road.  They  also allowed  governments  the  time to  create  the
additional incentives for quick efficiency improvements.
At  a  very  first  glance,  the  story  was  a  successful  one.  By  the  end  of  the  1990s,  the
reforms  had generated  total  private  infrastructure  investments  of US$360  billion.  Moreover,
there  is  ample  evidence  suggesting  that  the  reforms,  including  the  widespread  adoption  of
prices  caps,  were  generally  associated  with  improvements  in  efficiency  and reductions  in the
costs of producing many of the services.  2
A closer  look  at  the  stylized  facts  provides  a  somewhat  more  complex  story.  First,  as
impressive  as they were,  the private  sector investment flows represented  only about one third of
' According to Calderon, C., W. Easterly and L. Serven (2002),  public infrastructure  investment reductions  were
used to ensure over 50% of the primary  budget deficit during the 1980s and  1990s.
2 More specific examples  are provided below.2
the investment needs of the regions.3 Contrary to the hopes of many reformers, the private sector
did not become  the major  financier  of the  sector,  although  there  was rarely  a call  for private
sector participation in projects in Latin America  that went unanswered.4
Second,  there  was  a  downward  trend  in  public  infrastructure  investment  in  the region.
Yet, according  to Calderon and Easterly (2002),  private sector participation does not explain this
downward  trend in public infrastructure spending.  In fact there is little correlation.  The evidence
suggests  that  there  was  a  lot  of cream-skimming  and  that  governments  were  left  with  the
responsibility  to meet the  high costs  and  high  risks  associated  with  service  needs  of the  weak
cash  flow operations,  without the benefits of the intra-sectoral  cross-subsidies  of the past. Most
often, countries offered only the crown jewels of their infrastructure to the private sector, usually
because  they  brought  substantial  resources  to  the  treasury,  they  were  clearly  attractive  to  the
private sector, and the transaction and operation  were financially viable.
Third,  while  there  were  widely  noted  improvements  in  efficiency,  it  is  not  clear,
however,  that  the  cost  reductions  were  sufficient  to  compensate  for  the  decline  in  total
investment levels.
Fourth,  while evidence  on the efficiency  gains is increasingly  widespread,  the evidence
that not much of these gains were shared with the users is growing just as fast. S  Indeed, ther has
been  at best a weak correlation between  the size of efficiency  gains and decrease  in tariffs.  Also
if coverage  improved,  it did not improve  as  much  as expected.  Coverage  quickly expanded  on
unfulfilled demand with high commercial payoffs  and then expansion trickled down very slowly
along  income  levels, because  prices  did  not fall  as  much  as expected.  Coverage  went  from a
supply problem to a demand  problem.
Fifth,  the  contracts  proved  to  not be  the  predictable  regulatory  instruments  they  were
made out to be by the advisors  to the reformers.  About 30% of total contracts  were renegotiated,
3According to Fay (2000), the annual investments needed  for 2000-2005 should amount to about US$ 57 billion,
equivalent to 2.6 percent  of Latin America's GDP.
4 Note that this is to be expected since the private sector is not supposed or expected to come in as an investor in
projects not financially viable.  In those cases,  the investment needs or at least part of them  will have to come from
the public sector.  The real failure is the fact that privatization commissions  seldom took into account the residual
fiscal consequences  in the design of the degree and form of restructuring. The residual fiscal burden could often
have been reduced with better packages which combined  cream and milk!
S See for instance Estache et al. (2002),  the various chapters of the Ugaz/Waddams-Price  book (2003)  or the  various
papers presented  at the paper presented  at the February  2003 Center for Global Development Conference  on
Privatization and Income Distribution3
in 2 out of 3 cases at the request of the operators. The renegotiation incidence was, in fact, much
higher in the transport and water sectors.  6
These  stylized facts  may seem like a puzzle  in which the pieces  do not fit together.  The
main purpose of this paper to show how the various pieces actually do fit together.  In particular,
we  examine  the  extent  to  which  the  decision  to  adopt  price  caps  in  the  highly  uncertain
environments  with weak regulatory capacity  that characterized  Latin America,  affected  (down)
the investment levels, the cream skimming strategies, the efficiency levels, the high renegotiation
rates, and the overall sector performance.  The paper  draws  on the collective  field experience  of
its  authors  in  Latin  America,  the  slowly  growing  literature  on  infrastructure  regulation  in
developing  countries  and  on  the  preliminary  results  of  a  recent  research  project  on  contract
renegotiations  in the region.
The paper  is organized  as follows.  In section  2,  we  first review  briefly the diversity  of
infrastructure  reform  experiences  and  the  relative  role  of incentive  based  regulation  in  Latin
America.  In  section  3,  we  draw  on  the  main  lessons  from  a recent  empirical  analysis  of  the
impact  of the  adoption  of price  caps  on  the  odds of contract  renegotiations.  In  section  4,  we
review  the empirical  evidence on  the efficiency gains  that were  associated  with the adoption  of
incentive  based  regulatory  regimes  in  the  region.  In  section  5  we  present  Argentina's
experience to discuss the allocation of the efficiency gains between the various  actors involved in
the regulatory game.  In  section  6, we discuss the impact of the  adoption  of price cap  regimes on
the cost  of capital  Section  7  discusses  how  other  factors  contribute  significantly  to  solve  the
puzzle. We conclude  in section  8 on what the review suggests  in terms of the inheritance left by
Prof. Littlechild in Latin America's infrastructure  sector.
2. Latin America's infrastructure privatization and regulation  mechanisms
While  casual  observers  continue  to  associate  infrastructure  reforrns  with  privatization-
divestiture of assets-Latin America's  reality is more subtle.  What casual observers  usually refer
to as  privatization  often  did not actually  imply any  change  in  property.  Divestiture  is,  in  fact,
only  one  of the  four main  categories  of contracts  generally  associated  with  privatization.  The
others  are  management  contracts,  BOT/O  (Built  operate  and  transfer/own)  contracts  and
concessions.  Table 1 shows that 2 out of 3 contracts during the  1990s were concession  contracts
6 see Guasch (2003)  as well  as Guasch,  Laffont and  Straub (2003)  and Guasch, Kartacheva  and Quesada.  (2000)4
and  that  almost  all  water  and  transport  privatizations  were  concessions  while  in
telecommunications,  the norm was divestiture.  The popularity of concessions is easily explained
by  the  fact  that  they  allowed  a  relatively  easy  handling  of  constitutional,  legal  or  political
constraints  on privatizations.  With concessions,  governments  could,  for instance,  argue  that
they  were  not  selling  the  assets  of  the  country  and  hence  bypass  legal  or  constitutional
constraints and  reduce the criticisms of reforms by anti-privatization  segments of civil society.  7
These concession  contracts  also became the main  regulatory instrument,  while  the main
mandate  of the regulators  established  as part of the  reform process  was  to monitor compliance
with  these contracts.8 The more  specific  the content  of the contracts  on all  parties'  obligations,
the clearer the mandate of the regulators.  In most cases, these contracts cover a wide spectrum of
regulatory issues such as regulatory regimes and tariff design. It is thus in these contracts and the
related  legal instruments  that the concern  for efficiency  stemming from the proposals  made by
Professor Littlechild for the UK had the most impact.
Table 1:  Relative importance of Concessions  Contracts
in Infrastructure Privatization in Latin America
1990--2000






Source: World Bank PPI Database
The practical  institutional  solution  adopted  by  most reforming  governments  to  monitor
these  contacts  was  very  similar  to  the  British  model.  To  control  private  operators,  reformers
created a regulatory agency,  which was sector specific  in most countries,  but multi-sectoral  in a
few  others,  covering a group  of sector industries.  The formal  role of this agency  was to ensure
compliance  by all  parties  with  the terms  of the contract,  and to  balance  the  interests  of users,
operators  and  government,  and  to  act  and  interpret  on circumstances  loosely  described  or  not
7 Bolivia  offered  an  additional  interesting  creative  experience  and  combined traditional  privatization  transactions
with capitalization  a  new  mechanism  to  transfer  of public enterprises.  Under  capitalization,  the  State  transferred
shares equivalent to 50 percent of the firm to the operator who won the right to run the service in an auction.  It also
yields about 45 percent  to private pension fund  who  use  the funds  derived from this share  to pay old-age benefits
complementary  to  those  stemming  from  individual  retirement  accounts.  The  remaining  5  percent  accrues  to  the
company's employees.  For more details, see for instance, Barja and Urquiola (2003)
8  For a longer discussion, see Gomez-Ibanez  (2003)5
covered by the contract but under the general jurisdiction of the regulatory mandate. While  most
of  these  agencies  were  supposed  to  be  autonomous  and  accountable  in  principle,  very  few
enjoyed  these  qualities.  In  most  countries,  the  degree  of  political  control  over  regulatory
decisions  continued  to  be  a  dominant  source  of conflict  between  operators  and  governments.
There  are many instances  in which the operator  considered its main counterpart  to be the sector
minister or secretary  rather  than  the regulator.  And  in fact  in many cases  the  formal  appeal  to
regulatory  decisions  went  to  the  line  Minister,  wresting  autonomy  and  authority  from  the
regulator.  Moreover, while the regulatory agencies  were established statutorily,  they were rarely.
given  appropriate  resources,  training,  and  instruments  to  carry  on  their  mandate  effectively.
Overall,  the weakness  of  these  institutions  proved  to be  one  of the  main  determinants  of  the
social and efficiency outcomes of the reforms as discussed later.9
3.What the Incidence  of Renegotiations  Reveals
To identify the importance  of the choice of the regulatory  regime  on the success of reform, we
rely on a data base of  954 concession contracts awarded  between the mid 1980s and 2000, in the
Latin  America  and  Caribbean  Region.1 0 The  database  contains  detailed  information  about the
characteristics  of these concessions,  including  general  details  about the projects  (sector,  activity,
year of award),  the award  criteria, size and duration of the concession,  information with respect
to  the  institutional  context  and  degrees  of  freedom  of  the  regulator,  the  type  of regulatory
framework  put  in  place  (price  cap,  rate  of  return,  no  regulation),  and  other  details  of  the
concession  contract  like arbitration  clauses,  nationality  of operators,  among  others.  In  this data
base,  56%  of the contracts  were regulated  under  a price  cap regime,  20%  under  rate  of return
regulation.  For 24% of the contracts,  the regime was a hybrid one.
Table 2 shows how the choice of the two polar regulatory regimes,  price caps. vs. rate of
return,  influences  the odds of renegotiation.  As mentioned  earlier,  the majority of the contracts
were subject to  a price cap-and the hybrid  ones  were closer to a price cap than a rate of return
since they  only allowed  cost pass-through  for  a few  cost categories.  Formally,  the choice  was
consistent with the advice of the international consultants  recruited  to assist in the preparation  of
9  For an early discussion  of these issues  throughout Latin America,  see Guasch and  Spiller (1999), Berg and
Gutierrez (2000),  Stern and Holder (1999) or J. Stern (2000). For a more formal one, see Laffont (2003).
'° For a full description,  see Guasch (2003), and Guasch,  Laffont and Straub (2003).6
the  reforms.  The  marketing  for  this choice  was  based  on  now  common  but then  innovative
theoretical  arguments.  The regime,  it was  argued,  would  provide  high powered  incentives  for
securing efficiency gains, at least between tariff reviews  and the regime was low maintenance  in
the sense  that  it did not require,  at least  between  tariff reviews,  large  amounts of information-
about firm-operation-  levels. The fact that it induced a higher cost of capital because they tended
to pass on to the operators  a larger share of the project  risks was very seldom considered.  Also
the fact  that  the regime  was associated  with a  risk of under-investment  (which  has happened)
was surprisingly  seldom addressed  in a region  in which one of the main reasons to try to reform
and  privatize  was  to  attract  private  investment  to  compensate  for  a  reduction  in  public
investment.  At the time also, the fact that,  in practice, both regimes tend to converge in terms of
process  with the  level  of convergence  depending  on  the  frequency  of tariff reviews,  was  also
largely ignored.".
Table 2: Incidence of Renegotiated  Concession  Contracts According to Sectors and
Characteristics
All infrastructure  Transport  Water
sectors
30%  54.7%  l  _74.4_  __
% of Contracts Renegotiations  within regulatory regimes
With  Price Cap  38.1%  55.1%  |  88.%
With  Rate of Return Cap  12.8%  38.1%  t  14.3%
With Hybrid Regime*  24.4%  46.2%  j  39.6%
* Hybrid regimes are defined when, under a repime of price caps, a large number of costs components are allowed
automatic pass through into tariff adjustments.
Source:  Guasch (2003)
Table 2 shows that 1 in 3 contracts  were renegotiated  in Latin America and that the rate
goes  as  high as  1 in 2 for transport and  3 in 4 for the water  sector.  These  renegotiations  took
1  'See  Green and Rodriguez-Pardina  (I999)
12 The numbers for the hybrid regimes should be taken with some care, since there is some subjectivity in that
classification and also incomplete information  in determining the classification.7
place on average 2.19  years after the award  of the contract.  13  This  was for concessions granted
for  about  20 to  30  years  and  that  had  a  five  year period  for  a tariff review  (for concessions
granted  under a price  cap regime).  Table 2  also  shows that the choice of the regulatory regime
matters. In particular, Table 2 shows that a price cap regime strongly increases the probability of
renegotiation  well  ahead of the scheduled tariff revision-which  usually  was scheduled for the
end of the fifth year after the award of the contract.  Hybrids regimes did, as expected, better than
pure price caps, but not as well, in terms of renegotiations,  as rate of return regimes.14
While Table 3 shows the important  role operators  have in initiating the renegotiations,  it
is also  interesting  to  analyze  the  extent  to  which  the  regulatory  regime  is correlated  with  the
originator of the request for renegotiation.  Essentially,  in 2 out of every 3 contracts, the change is
requested  by the operator.  This  is a significant proportion.  Within  the context of this paper, the
obvious next question is the extent to which the request for renegotiation is driven by the choice
of the regulatory regime. Table 4 provides the answer.
Table 3: Who initiated the Renegotiation?
(% of total requests)
Both Government and Operator  Government  Operator
All sectors  13%  36%  61%
Water and Sanitation  10%  24%  66%
Transport  16%  27%  57%
Source: Guasch (2003)
When  examining  the data  on the  regulatory regime,  Table  4 shows that the  initiator  of
renegotiations,  was  overwhelmingly  (86%)  the  operator  when  under  a  price  cap  regime,
corroborating  our hypothesis.  The percentage  drops  considerably  (26%)  when the operator was
under  a rate of return  regime,  as expected  under  our hypothesis.  Table  4 might  imply  that the
efficiency gains achieved  by the operators may not have been large enough  to provide them with
13 It was 3.3  years-accounting for construction lag time- in the transport sector and  1.6 years in the water sector
(Guasch, 2003)
14  It may be useful to point out  that the adoption  of a  hybrid  regimes  was generally  the  result of renegotiations  of
contracts  initially  subject to a price cap regime.  Indeed,  in general, the main change in the regime was an increase in
the number of cost categories that enjoyed automatic  pass-through.  In sum, the initial price cap choice has tended  to
be short lived  in Latin America,  in particular in the transport and in the water and sanitation sector.8
the rents they were expecting  to get when they  signed the contract,  or that they saw  a favorable
environment to secure more favorable  terms through renegotiation  demands.
A review of the evidence on the efficiency gains achieved as a result of the restructuring
is thus a necessary  step to be able to assess the contribution of the adoption of price cap regimes
to the degree of renegotiation in the region.  15
Table 4: Who initiated the renegotiation conditioned  on regulatory regime?
(% of total requests)
Both Government and Operator  Government  Operator
All sectors
Price Caps  11%  6%  83%
Rate of Return  39%  34%  26%
Hybrid Regime  30%  26%  44%
Source: Guasch (2003)
4. The efficiency  payoffs  from the adoption of price caps and other reforms
A plethora  of studies evaluating  different aspects of the impact of the reform program  in
infrastructure  in Latin  America  have  been  recently  completed  (e.g.  Birsdall  and Nellis  (2002)
and  Ugaz  and Waddams  (2003)).  Practically  all of them  show  significant  performance  gains,
improved  quality  of  service  and  increases  in  coverage  (but  not  as  large  as  expected).  For
example,  in  their study  of the regulation of the electricity  sector in Latin America  and of the
telecommunications  sector,  Fischer  and  Serra  (2000,  2002)  argue  that the privatization-cum-
regulation  of these  Latin  American  sectors  has  been,  in  general  terms,  successful:  privatised
firms have sharply increased their efficiency and coverage.
Most  of  these  studies,  however,  shy  away  from  the  economic  efficiency  concept
associated with the adoption of a price cap regime. The evidence on this measure of efficiency is
much more scarce and does not cover all sectors nor all countries equally well. We  thus need to
rely  on highly diverse types of studies  to document the efficiency  gains.  Among the studies on
15 For Argentina, see  Chisari, o., A. Estache  and C. Romero (1999),  Delfino,  J.A. and A. Casarin  (2003)  or Ennis
and Pinto (2003);  for Bolivia,  see  Barja and Urquiolo  (2003); for Brazil,  Mueller  (2001); for Chile, Bitran,  E.,  A.
Estache,  J. L. Guasch and  P. Serra (1999), Engel,  E, R. Fisher and A. Galetovic  (2000),  Paredes (2003)  or Rudnick
and  Raineri  (1997):  and  for Peru  , Torero,  M  and A. Pasco-Font  (2003) for  evidence  on the  effects  on prices,
quality and investments but this is less directly associated to the adoption of the price cap regime.9
efficiency,  the electricity  sector  is the  only one  to enjoy  a  representative  coverage  thanks to  a
series of papers by  Rossi (2001,  2002 and 2003). Rossi works  with data on 39 firms covering a
dozen countries between  1994 and 2000. He finds an  annual average rate of productivity change
around  1 percent  for that period,  mainly  from the  technical  change  component.  Moreover,  his
evidence  also  suggests  that  private  firms  are  the  firms  that  are  pushing  the  South  American
production  frontier  in  the right  direction.  He finds  no evidence  of technical  progress  in public
firms,  whereas  technical  change  in  private  firms  is  around  2  percent  per  year.  Since  the
renegotiation  rates are  fairly  low  in this  sector,  it seems to suggest  that both the  regulators  and
the operators were satisfied with these gains.
There  is unfortunately  no comparable  cross-country  coverage  for the other sectors;  most
of their evidence  is for  specific  experiences.  Accounting  for  this limitation,  the  various  studies
provide  reasonable  anecdotal  evidence  suggesting  that  reforms  have  on  average  improved
efficiency  quite  significantly  throughout  the  region.  For  railways,  Estache  et  al.  (2002a)
estimated  TFP with Tomnqvist indexes for Argentina's  passenger and freight railways  companies
and for Brazil's freight railways companies which both work under price caps. In Argentina, they
find  an average  annual  efficiency gain  of 5.3%  for freight  and 9.8%  for passenger  concessions.
In  Brazil,  the  average  TFP  growth  has  been  8.4%  in  the  first  two  years  after  the  private
operation  of the  sector  started.  Before  the  annual  efficiency  gains  achieved  during  a  gradual
restructuring  process started in  1985, the average improvement  in TFP was 5.5%. An interesting
difference between  the two countries'  experience,  is that all Argentinean  freight contracts ended
up being renegotiated  while  all the Brazilian  freight  contracts worked  out well  and are on track
for a scheduled tariff revision.  Additional differences  between the two countries include the fact
that  demand  was  grossly  overestimated  in  Argentina  in  comparison  to  Brazil  and  that  the
resources  allocated  to  the  monitoring  of  the  contracts  were  much  larger  in  Brazil  than  in
Argentina.
For telecoms, Benitez et al. (2002) relies on an engineering-economic  model (also known
as  hybrid  cost  proxy  models-HCPM)  to  estimate  that  in  one  of  Argentina's  provinces,  the
efficiency  gains  achieved  between  1991  and  2000  were  about  3.9%  per  year,  including  the
benefits from the major technological  changes  the sector enjoyed.  Some degree of renegotiation
also  took place  in that  sector  to  allow  contract  extensions.  For Brazil,  Resende  and  Facanha
(2002)  using  a Data  Envelope  Analysis  (DEA)  do  not find  any  statistically  significant  impact10
during  the first  18 months  after the opening of the sector to private operators  under a price cap
regime.
For ports, Estache et al. (2002b) focus on the effects of the  1993 port reform Mexico over
the  1996-99  period.  They  rely on  a stochastic  production  frontier  to  show  that Mexico's  ports
achieved  2.8-3.3%  average  annual  efficiency  gains  since  reform under  a  price  cap regime.  In
that experience,  there was no renegotiation.
For  water,  Estache  and  Trujillo  (2002)  also  rely  on  a  Tornqvist index  to  assess  the
efficiency gains  achieved  with reform in Argentina and find average  annual TFP gains between
3.7%  and  6.1%  depending  on  which  provinces  are  included  in  the  sample.  In  one  of the
provinces  covered  by  the  study,  the  regulator has  been  in  permanent  renegotiation  which  has
resulted in a regulatory regime which is moving slowly but surely towards a cost-plus  regime. In
another  one, the company  was  returned to  the public  sector but continued  to be in  a price cap
regime  and  has  managed  to  continue  improving  efficiency  under  the  renewed  public
management.
Overall,  this overview of the studies  on efficiency  available for Latin America  suggests
that in the vast majority of cases, the reforms, including the introduction of price caps, generated
improvements  in efficiency.  Why  would then  operators  request  so frequently  renegotiations,  in
particular in water and sanitation  and  in transport?  Three  scenarios  could explain the drive for
renegotiations  or unhappiness  of the operators. Under the first scenario,  they could not retain the
efficiency  gains,  at least not long  enough for the  effort  to be worth  the  cost.  This implies  that
these gains might  have been captured by another player in the regulatory game.  Under a second
scenario,  the adoption of an incentive-based  regulatory regime  could have  resulted in a cost of
capital  that  was  inconsistent  with  the  rate  of return  generated  by  the business  in  spite  of the
efficiency gains achieved.  The need to cut the cost of capital would be what leads  them to review
some cost categories  as part of the renegotiation.  Under the third scenario-  a combination  of the
previous  two  scenarios-operators  saw  a  favorable  environment  to  secure  additional  benefits,
using  their  effective  leverage,  through  renegotiation  of  the  terms  of the  contract.  These
possible explanations  are explored next.
5. Where did all the efficiency gains go?"6
16 For more details, see Estache,  A. (2003)11
An easy, although  admittedly weak,  test of how  the regulators  distributed  the efficiency
gains  is  the correlation between  efficiency  and average  tariff changes.  17  Two main  outcomes
can be expected  from this analysis.  First, either tariff and efficiency  gains  are highly negatively
correlated, in which case, the adoption of the price cap achieved a fair outcome for users but this
can explain the requests for renegotiation by the operator.  Second, there is no correlation and this
suggests that incentive based regulation did not achieve much for the users.  The more interesting
story  is  the reason  for  why  there  is  no correlation.  One  explanation  could  simply be  that  the
regulator was unable  to deliver  on its mandate  and the operator appropriated  the gains  (Table  6
below provides  some evidence on  that). Another is that the government  may have  hijacked part
of the gains for fiscal purposes through tax increases.
To illustrate  the point,  the  Argentina  case is analysed  here  as  a representative  of the
1990s  in  the  region.  Table  5 summarizes  the  evidence  for  Argentina  and  shows  that  the
increasing use of the privatised  sector as a tax handle may provide a good explanation as to why
operators were not happy with the price cap system.
Table 5: Comparing annual real tariff levels  to efficiency  changes since privatization
Electricity  Gas  Water Distribution  Telecoms  -
Distribution  Distribution '  e  .
-fficienc~ych~nge  do not wiaef to gohand in: hand . 9,  ,,  . U  ,,  . , ,. ..  ,  ,di  ff,~  1.;'
Annual average tax  -0.75% %  -0.8%  +1.75%  -0.6%
inclusive  tariff
change  (for Aguas Argentinas)
Possible  1%  2.9%  6.1%  3.9%
approximation of  (shift)  (shift +  (shift + average catching  (shift + catching  up)
annual efficiency  average  up for 4 water companies)  [set at 2%  between 91
Gains to be used in  catching up)  3.7%  and 96 as part of cap]
tariff revision  (without Mendoza)  (in Mendoza)
1.9%
(for Aguas  Argentinas)
Indirect Tax  20-57%  20-30%  20-30%  40-50%
Source:  Authors tabulation  based on Delfin and Casarin (2001), Benitez, et al. (2001),  Rossi (2001), Estache and Trujillo (2002)
17  A second test is to check on the changes  in the tariff structure  across user and consumption  types and to see how
each one compares to the evolution of efficiency.  If each category gets a similar cut of the efficiency  gains  in terms
of reductions in tariffs, the perception  will be that the distribution  was fair--even  if differentiated distribution  of
gains may simply reflect improvements  in allocative  efficiency, in  which there is a better mach between cost and
tariff per user and usage type.12
The table  suggests  that the efficiency  gains have  indeed  often been  significant  but were
generally  not  quickly  passed  on  to  users,  during  the  1990s.  More  specifically,  while
technical/productive  efficiency  improved,  which  means  costs  dropped,  average  tariffs  did  not
drop  commensurately.  It  suggests  that  a rent  may  have  been  created through  efficiency  gain
improvements.  The bottom part of the table reveals the beneficiary of the rent: the government.  It
may  have  hijacked  the  efficiency  gains  through  the  tax  system.  While  there  are  obvious
advantages  to this for any country in fiscal crisis,  it significantly  reduces  the signaling effect of
the price system.
It turns  out that,  in Argentina,  as in most  of the  other countries  of the  region,  all  three
levels of government  have contributed  to minimize  the redistribution  of the efficiency  gains  to
the users, through  major increases  in indirect  taxes. For Argentina,  the infrastructure  sectors are
such  an  effective  tax  handle  that  they  generate  over  1% of  GDP  in  tax  revenue  across
government  levels.  Total  indirect  taxes  add  up  to  40-50%  on  telecoms  services,  20-57%  in
energy and over 20% on water services. This is 4 to 5 times the revenue it used to generate when
these services were public.
The  upshot  of  this  review  of  the  distribution  of  the  efficiency  gains  is  a-rational-
discontent by the users. Users  grew unhappy  as  average  tariffs slowly increased.  In water,  this
was due to  a major catching up of tariffs with costs in a sector in which  average  costs recovery
rates  have  long been  around  25%. 8  As  for passenger  transport, the effective  increase  in tariff
was infinite in  many cases,  since prior to the reforms, roads were free  and the effective fares  in
buses  and  rails were  quite low  since  many  users  evaded the  payment  obligation  under  public
operation.  Even  for those users,  including  non residential  users,  who  were  used to  pay for the
services, over time, the improvements in service quality were insufficient to compensate  the fact
that tariff  appeared to be creeping  up-and no one seemed to really notice the  role of taxes in
this creeping up.
In  sum,  it  seems  that  the  successive  public  administrations  have  benefited  from  the
efficiency  gains.  In  addition  to  the lump-sum  payments  at  the  signature  of the contract  or  the
annual  payments  due  by  the  operator,  the  governments  are  now  able  to  cash  in  more  from
reforms  through  the tax  system.  The problem is that  in water  and transport,  the reforms  have
18  See  World Development Report (1994).13
often  not been  as financially  successful  as they were in energy and telecoms, which may explain
why there are so many requests for renegotiation by the private operators in these sectors.
6. Did price caps push the cost of capital too much?
In  addition  to  the  unhappiness  of  the  operators  with  the  taxation  of  some  of  their
potential rents,  the second reason  why some of the operators may have been eager to renegotiate
was the impact of  the adoption of price caps on the cost of capital relatively in the region. Table
6, focusing on the cost of equity, shows how this cost of capital has evolved in the region during
the  1990s  through the  early 2000s.  Of course, the data is very rough since  the increase reflects
many  changes, most importantly,  the effect of the Tequila and Asian crisis in the region, but it
provides interesting basic insights. In particular,  it shows that in transport  and water, the cost of
capital has been the highest throughout the period.
The two  cost of equity  columns  show  its average  value  at the time of the award-initial-
and  the  value  in  2001-current.  The  obvious  increase  in  this  cost  of  capital  across  sectors
corroborates  the hypothesis  made  above.'9 It is  also  in these two  sectors-water  and  transport-,
that the investment needs were the highest but that at the same time cost recovery through  tariffs
was the most politically difficult for obvious  social and political reasons.  In these two sectors  the
expected fiscal contribution of the public sector in the form of subsidies for operational or capital
expenditures  was also expected to be the highest and seldom delivered on.
Table 6: The cost of equity in Latin America in the 1990s20
SECTOR  Initial Cost of Equity  Current Cost of Equity
Telecom  13%  17%
Energy  14%  18%
Water  16%  19%
Transport  18.5%  21%
Source:  Foster, Guasch, Pinglo and Sirtaine  (2003), preliminary results
As a risk mitigation  strategy  aiming  at offsetting the  increase  in the  cost of capital,  the
request,  as part of the renegotiation,  for automatic  pass through rules for as  many categories  as
19 But it understates the actual  total cost of capital since it does not recognize  the significant  increase in the costs of
debt.
20 The cost of equity is  a measure of the appropriate return that investors should expects on equity investments in a
specified country and sector,  given the level of risk of such investments.14
21 possible  was  thus  a  rational  strategy  for  the  operators.  It  was,  of  course,  not  the  only
instrument  and in many instances the renegotiations were aimed at increasing the rate of return to
keep  it  consistent  with  the  increasing  cost  of capital.  This  is why  slowing  down  investment,
reducing service  obligations  or increasing direct  or indirect subsidies  were  all addressed  as part
of the  renegotiations,  in  particular  in  the  water  and  transport  sectors.  This is why  a common
outcome of most renegotiations  was a decrease in the level and pace of investments.
In balance,  it is difficult to use this data to isolate the effect of price caps on  the cost of
capital.  Even from the rate of return  perspective,  assessing the extent to which the rate of return
has simply been adjusting to an increasing risk premium associated with a price cap regime is not
an  easy  task.  Indeed,  in  most Latin  American  countries,  the  accounting  systems  are not  very
good  and  hence easy  to manipulate.  Depending  on how  costs  are  allocated  and depending  on
whether management fees collected by operators are classified  as a revenue or as a cost, the rate
of return on capital can vary 9% to 33%  in any given sector.  Considering that the cost of capital
varied between  15%  and  25%  in most of the  sectors  for most  of the countries,  it is clearly  not
very easy to assess how much  the regulatory regime mattered.
In sum, the only evidence  available on price caps as a source of concern for the operators
comes  from the  preference  for  less  risky regulatory  regimes  which  is  shown by  the  changes
brought  by renegotiation.  As already  mentioned,  renegotiation  tends to lead to a transformation
of most price caps into hybrid regimes, and de-legitimizes the price cap regime,  both on grounds
of the  speed of change  of the agreed  terms  and of the  outcome.  This,  in turn,  suggests  that  if
costs  plus  regime  had  been  adopted  to  begin  with,  renegotiation  may  have  been  avoided.
However,  the question then becomes: if rate of return regulation had been adopted from the start,
would  the efficiency  gains observed have materialized?  To be able to address  this question  it is
necessary to account for many more factors than we have been focusing on up to now.
7.  The relevance  of institutions, process and contract design
While  the  main purpose  of the  paper  was  to  study  the  interactions  between  regulatory
regime  and  contract  sustainability,  the  research  conducted  by  Guasch  (2003)  suggest  that  it
21  These requests are consistent  with the results of the two papers which show that  price caps are indeed
associated  with higher cost of capital  than rate of return regulation both for utilities and transport operations,  see
Ian Alexander  et al. (1996 and 2001).15
would be naive to focus only on the choice  of the regulatory regime  to explain  the outcome of
reforns  in  Latin  America.  Table  7  summarizes  the  main  statistics  on  the  occurrence  of
renegotiation  according  to the main characteristics  of the reforms.22
Table 7: What drove renegotiaons?
Renegotiated Concessions  as a  All sectors  All  Sectors (w/o  Transport  Water
%  of the category  Telecom)
Total
29.0  42.5  54.9  75.0
Award criterion
Lowest Tariff  60.4  61.0  60.0  81.9
High Price paid to govemment.  11.0  26.2  32.5  66.6
Multiple  Criteria  34.3  34.3  38.1  0.00
Regulatory  -
Framework  . ._._.
In Law  17.2  25.7  53.4  55.6
In  Decree  27.8  28.0  58.6  83.5
In Contract  39.7  40.6  50.8  70.7
Lnstitutions...  ...,
Regulators  in place  17.1  25.2  50.2  40.9
Regulator niot in place  60.9  73.5  62.5  87.5
Type of Tarift  Regulation- 
Price Cap  38.1  43.8  55.1  88.8
Rate of Return  12.8  13.1  38.1  14.3
Regulatory Obligations
Regulating by means (Investment  51%  70%  76%  85%
obligations)
Regulating by Objectives  24%  18%  19%  25%
(Performance  indicators)
Table  7  shows  that in addition  to the  choice  between  price caps  and  rate  of return,  the
award  criterion,  existence of investment  obligations,  the form of the legal support  to regulation
and  the timing of the establishment  of the regulatory  institutions  also substantially  affects  the
probability of renegotiation.  The design of the auctions  and contract  is also significant because it
opens  opportunities  for  renegotiation  and  reducing  lock-in  effects  on  operators.  The  legal
grounding of regulation  in a  highly reversible  legal instrument-such  as  a decree-  does  not help
much.  All  that  made  it  easy  for  operators  to  expect  and  thus  ask  for  better  terms  and
compensation  for changes  requested  in the contract  and ended  up  increasing  the percentage  of
the costs benefiting  from a time  of escalation  and  indexation  clause,  and  reducing  or delaying
investment obligations or performance indicators.
22 For  a longer discussion,  see Guasch and  Spiller (1999)16
Yet, having said that, the fact remains that risk factors and the allocation  of risks do affect
significantly the  cost of capital  and financial equation of projects.  On that account,  the choice  of
the regulatory  regime  and  how  one  accounts  for  its implications  remains  a key  factor on  the
outcome of reforms.
8. Concluding comments
Latin  American  countries  adopted  the  price  caps  regime  with  a  vengeance.
Unfortunately,  they merely  swallowed  rather than digested  the concept,  not accounting  for its
full range of implications.  The problems the region has experienced  with the reform program in
infrastructure  and with the adoption of price caps as shown here are the result of this eagerness to
adopt a concept in theory rather than in practice.
The way the price caps,  and more generally reforms,  were handled  in practice,  as shown
in  this  paper,  raises  some  frustrating  questions.  Would  a  less  incentive  based  regime  have
resulted  in  more  and  better  investment?  Had  the  region  created  earlier,  stronger  and  better
regulatory institutions, would the outcomes have  been better? Was the problem the choice of the
regulatory  regime  or are we  trying to blame everything  on one  of many factors that contributed
to  the  high  renegotiation  rates?  Finally,  could  the  high  incidence  of renegotiation  have  been
avoided ? And was renegotiation all that bad?
The answers to most of these questions boil down to an understanding  of how price caps
and  cost  of capital  interact  in  high  risk,  weak  governance  environments.  Weak  regulatory
capacity  and weak effective government commitment to improve that capacity  in Latin America
led to the fact that price caps  alone did not yield the expected benefits for the users.  Price caps
did provide  incentives  for operators  quickly  securing efficiency  gains, but  many of these  gains
were then captured by the governments or firms rather than shared with the users. Users were in
fact penalized  twice,  since these efficiency  gains came  at the cost of a higher cost of capital and
thus higher tariffs  to cover  that increase--relative  to  a rate of return  regime.  Compounding  the
pain  inflicted  on the users is the fact that renegotiations,  generally  associated with  the adoption
of  price  cap  regime,  tended  to  delay  or bring  down  investment  levels,  as  firms  do  not  get
immediate  rewards-through  tariff  adjustments-on investments  (either the existing tariffs  already17
account  for expected  investments  or tariffs  will  be adjusted but only  at the  next tariff review
period, usually a few years down the road).
Ultimately,  the  easiness  and  fast  renegotiation  of contracts-before  the  usual  five  year
review-  may eventually  lead  to the adoption  of new  regimes which  will  result  in fairer tariffs,
better  access and  stronger commitment  to fair returns  to investors.  This  seems to be happening
through  the adoption  of  hybrid  regimes  which  will  retain  some of the  incentive  effects  of the
price caps while  introducing cost recovery  guarantees that may ultimately  reduce  tariffs because
they will reduce the uncertainty  of doing business  in the region, and hence the cost of capital. In
sum,  what the  1990s Latin American experience  shows is that, just like privatization alone  (e.g.
without competition) is associated with few benefits for an economy, price caps alone will not do
much for the users  .
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